



**IISERB**

# DOMAINS WHERE LOCAL STRATEGY-PROOFNESS IMPLIES DICTATORSHIP

We investigate preference domains where every unanimous and locally strategy-proof social choice function (scf) is dictatorial. First, we show that preference domains where unanimous and locally strategy-proof scfs are dictatorial are connected with two distinct neighbors. Further, we show that among the class of tops-only domains, domains that are connected with two distinct neighbors ensure that every unanimous and locally strategy-proof scf is dictatorial.



**06 October, 2023, 4:00 PM**

**GRAVITY BUILDING: ROOM NO - A1**



**DR. ANUP PRAMANIK**

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Dr. Pramanik is an Associate Professor of Economics at Shiv Nadar University (SNU), with expertise in Mechanism Design, Social Choice Theory, and matching problems. He earned his Ph.D. from ISI, Delhi, under Dr. Arunava Sen's supervision. Following his Ph.D., Dr. Pramanik pursued post-doctoral research at ISER, Osaka University, and later became an Assistant Professor at the same institution. He then held positions at IIM Indore and SNU. Dr. Pramanik's research has been featured in esteemed journals, including the Journal of Economic Theory, Economic Letters, Social Choice and Welfare, Games and Economic Behavior. He is an active referee for several academic journals and imparts knowledge through teaching courses on Game Theory, Market Design, and Graph Theory applied to Economics etc..

**DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SCIENCES**